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The Ukraine Aid Debacle
After a lengthy discussion in Berlin on 12 January 2015, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, Russia and the
Ukraine declared their intention to seek a political solution to the situation in the Ukraine. A summit meeting in
Astana, Kazakhstan’s capital since 1997, was being considered.
The
press release
published by the German Foreign Office stated: “The Ministers affirmed their strong commitment to a swift and
comprehensive peaceful solution of the current crisis, including a sustainable political process. Ministers
reconfirmed that the basis for conflict resolution are the Minsk agreements that have to be implemented by all
sides in their entirety. They reiterated the necessity to fully respect the regime of quiet.”
In the race to weaken Russia, Europe, including Germany, promised financial and other aid, even military aid,
after the financial summit in Brussels in early March 2013. In early 2013, the Ukrainian Government estimated
the country’s financial needs through 2016 to be €25 billion. The world was no unaware of the head of state’s
declaration of bankruptcy.
The U.S. provided the country, whose Western side is European and whose Eastern side is Russian, with €725 million.
The EU wanted to give €11 billion. Both of these payments were provided by means of unsecured loans. Furthermore,
Europe was to supply the Ukraine with gas, since the Russian company GAZPROM, which had supplied it at a reduced
price to support reforms, was no longer willing to do this after a new government was elected in May 2013. The
mostly European energy giants Shell and ExxonMobil were already smelling big business, because they make money
even at low prices.
Political give and take is like the pimping business. This includes the so-called
Association Agreement,
which was supposed to merge the interests of the EU and the Ukraine, but which was not signed until September 2014
after it was clear that a legitimate and elected government was in power. Since elections in May 2013, there had
been many delays and the Agreement was even rejected in November 2013. Further negotiations were necessary, as the
Ukraine ultimately did not want to sell itself to the West so cheaply.
During all this time, the associated sanctions backed by Europe against Russia were taking effect. These sanctions
included visa restrictions for travel to the EU from Russia. Not surprisingly, there was no agreement to suspend
the supply of weapons. Also, there would be no trade embargo or freezing of Russian assets in the EU. Russia
countered any such considerations by calling attention to outstanding loans with EU banks in the amount of €183
billion. The EU talked big in half-stifled tones, and Russia just laughed. The Ukraine negotiated with
outstretched hands and was probably pleased that, with the Association Agreement, it was signing a free-trade
pact that would result in the Ukraine becoming part of the EU and no longer being subject to the political will
of Russia.
Reliance on the EU was probably the greatest deception. The agreement in early 2015, via the European Commission,
to provide an additional €1.8 billion euros (based on unsecured loans) to the bankrupt states could not be
fulfilled because the latter could not afford it, at least not without overstraining the manipulated European
budget, in which the loan-financed bailout was not reflected on the balance sheets. The summit proposed for Astana
by Russian, Ukrainian, French and German leaders had still not been confirmed on 15 January 2015.
The tug of war over the Ukraine, which could become the spearhead of Europe, continues. Whether or not this
propels the reform process that the country should be undergoing is doubtful. It is more likely that the Ukraine
will be pulverized by the over-bloated giants of the EU, the U.S. and Russia. The German government should stop
supporting this situation if it is really interested in the Ukraine becoming a democratic state. Otherwise there
is a risk of sham democracy and the appearance of a confederation of states that has obviously not learned that
lying and the promise of unrealistic aid cannot lead to the independent development of a country, but perhaps
this is what the EU wants and the Ukraine must play along because it has no other choice but to shift from one
dependency to the next.
The Merkel government has squandered the diplomatic skills that should be protecting Germany in this matter. It
promises aid that it cannot deliver. Now, Merkel is depending on Russia to continue to engage in the banter and
forget to take any further actions that could lead to war in Europe. Germany is therefore not acting on its own
free will, but stands before the EU, whose politicians have long lost control over the monetary situation.
Stalling a negotiating partner is a risky gamble. Merkel should know that this cannot play out in her favour and
that Russia’s power is undiminished. Stalling a negotiating partner on the basis of a lie will cause Russia to be
miffed about any negotiation results and not comply with any agreements reached.
However, Europe must be able to depend upon that if it is to trust the politicians negotiating on behalf of its
people. This must not be demonstrated to the chancellor or the European Commission or other European leaders.
The German government must have at least that much negotiating skill, a sufficient range of proposals, interest
in its negotiating partners and respect for the Russian government. It should be taking steps to protect the
approximately 30,000 ethnic Germans living in the Ukraine, provide more support on a humanitarian and economic
basis, and collaborate on research instead of leaving itself at the mercy of other interests in the World.
German has nothing to give. Financial aid cannot be funded by the already fictitious budget. A state as bankrupt
as Germany, which makes false promises, does not help. It lies and helps other powers violate human rights and
undermine democratic structures.
The Ukraine may be following poor role models because it has no experience in fighting for real direct democratic
structures. Germany should know better, however, and refrain from politically motivated manoeuvring. If German has
not already managed to establish real, direct democracy at home, it should not cheat another country out of a real
chance to implement it when that country needs help.
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